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Abstract
We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games.
The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs
in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the sufficient conditions for a pair of
continuous function to provide a Nash equilibrium. This result generalizes the method of
system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
1 Introduction
In this paper we characterize Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games.
We consider nonzero-sum differential games in the framework of positional strategies first
suggested by N.N. Krasovskii for zero-sum differential games [1]. The existence of Nash
equilibrium was established in works of A.F. Kononenko [2] and A.F. Kleimenov [3]. The
proof is based on punishment strategies technique. This technique permits to characterize
the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs [3], [4].
The main result of this paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium
payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the sufficient conditions for
a pair of continuous function to provide a Nash equilibrium. This result generalizes the
method of the systems of Hamilton-Jacobi equations.
2 Preliminaries
We consider the following doubly controlled system
x˙ = f(t, x, u, v), t ∈ [t0, ϑ0], x ∈ R
n, u ∈ P, v ∈ Q. (1)
Here u and v are controls of the player I and the player II respectively. Payoffs are terminal.
The player I wants to maximize σ1(x(ϑ0)), the player II wants to maximize σ2(x(ϑ0)). We
assume that the sets P and Q are compacts, the function f , σ1 and σ2 are continuous,
∗The work is supported by RFBR (grant No 09-01-00436-a), Grant of President of Russian Federation (project
MK-7320.2010.1), RAS Presidium Program of Fundamental Researches “Mathematical Theory of Control”.
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moreover f is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the phase variable, and satisfies the
sublinear growth condition with respect to x.
The use the control design suggested in [3]. This control design follows N.N. Krasovskii
positional formalization. Feedback strategy of the Player I is a pair of function U =
(u(t, x, ε), β1(ε)). Here u(t, x, ε) is a function of position (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0] × R
n and pre-
cision parameter ε, β1(ε) is a continuous function of precision parameter. We suppose
that β1(ε) → 0, ε → 0. Analogously, the feedback strategy of the Player II is a pair
V = (v(t, x, ε), β2(ε)).
Let a position (t∗, x∗) be chosen. Step-by-step motion is defined in the following way. We
suppose that the players choose precision parameters ε1 and ε2 respectively. Let the Player I
choose the partition of the interval [t∗, ϑ0] ∆1 = {τj}
r
j=0 of the fineness less than ε1. Suppose
that the Player II chooses the partition ∆2 = {ξk}
ν
k=1 of the fineness less than ε2. The
solution x[·] of equation (1) with initial date x[t∗] = x∗ such that the control of the Player I is
equal to u(τj, x[τj ], ε1) on [τj, τj+1), and the control of the Player II is equal to v(ξk, x[ξk], ε2)
on [ξk, ξk+1) is called a step-by-step motion. Denote it by x[·, t∗, x∗;U, ε1,∆1;V, ε2;∆2].
The set of all step-by-step motions from the position (t∗, x∗) under strategies U and V
and precision parameters ε1 and ε2 is denoted by X(t∗, x∗;U, ε1;V, ε2). The step-by-step
motions is called consistent if ε1 = ε2.
A limit of step-by-motions x[·, tk, xk;U, εk1 ,∆
k
1 ;V, ε
k
2 ,∆
k
2 ] is called constructive motion if
tk → t∗, x
k → x∗, ε
k
1 → 0, ε
k
2 → 0, k →∞. Denote by X(t∗, x∗;U, V ) the set of constructive
motions. By Arzela-Ascoli theorem the set of constructive motions is nonempty. If the limit
is taken only by consistent step-by-step motions the limit is called consistent constructive
motions. Denote the set of consistent constructive motions by Xc(t∗, x∗;U, V ). This set is
nonempty also.
The following definition of Nash equilibrium is used.
Definition 1. Let (t∗, x∗) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n. The pair of strategies UN and V N is said to be
Nash equilibrium solution at the position (t∗, x∗), if for all strategies U and V the following
inequalities hold:
max{σ1(x[ϑ0]) : x[·] ∈ X(t∗, x∗, U, V
N )} ≤ min{σ1(x
c[ϑ0]) : x
c[·] ∈ Xc(t∗, x∗, U
N , V N )}.
max{σ2(x[ϑ0]) : x[·] ∈ X(t∗, x∗, U
N , V )} ≤ min{σ2(x
c[ϑ0]) : x
c[·] ∈ Xc(t∗, x∗, U
N , V N )}.
The pair of payoff (J1, J2) determined by a Nash solution is called a Nash equilibrium
payoff of the game. In the typical case there are many Nash equilibriums with different
payoffs. The set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs is called a Nash value of the game and is
denoted by by N (t∗, x∗). One can consider multivalued map taking (t∗, x∗) to the N (t∗, x∗).
The set N (t∗, x∗) is nonempty under the Isaacs condition [3], [2]. The proof is based
on the punishment strategy technique. If the Isaacs condition is not fulfilled the Nash
equilibrium solution exists in the class of mixed strategies or in the class of pair counter-
strategy/strategy [3].
Below we suppose the Isaacs condition holds: for all t ∈ [t0, ϑ0], x, s ∈ R
n
min
u∈P
max
v∈Q
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉 = max
v∈Q
min
u∈P
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉.
Remark 1. If the Isaacs condition doesn’t hold, one can consider the solution in the class
of mixed strategies. For this purpose we consider doubly controlled system
x˙ =
∫
P
∫
Q
f(t, x, u, v)ν(dv)µ(du), t ∈ [t0, ϑ], x ∈ R
n, µ ∈ rpm(P ), ν ∈ rpm(Q). (2)
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Here µ is a generalized control of the Player I, ν is a generalized control of the Player II,
rpm(P ), rpm(Q) are sets of regular probabilistic measures on P and Q respectively. We
endow the sets rpm(P ) and rpm(Q) with ∗-weak topology. Obtained topology spaces are
compacts. It is easy to show that the Isaacs condition is fulfilled for system (2). Further
we will not mention the change from system (1) to system (2).
Consider the zero-sum differential game Γ1 with dynamic determined by (1) and the
payoff determined by σ1(x(ϑ0)). We assume that the Player I wants to maximize σ1(x(ϑ0))
the interest of the Player II is opposite. There exists the value of the game Γ1. Denote it
by ω1. Analogously consider the zero-sum differential game with the dynamics (1) and the
payoff σ2. We assume that the Player II wants to maximize σ2(x(ϑ0)) while the Player I
want to minimize it. Denote the value of this game by ω2.
3 Main result
Consider the differential inclusion
x˙ ∈ F(t, x) , co{f(t, x, u, v) : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q}. (3)
By Sol(t∗, x∗) denote the set of solution of (3) with initial data x(t∗) = x∗.
Proposition 1. Let the multivalued map T : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → P(R2) satisfy the following
conditions:
(N1) T (t, x) ⊂ [ω1(t, x),∞) × [ω2(t, x),∞) for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n;
(N2) T (ϑ0, x) = {(σ1(x), σ2(x))} for all x ∈ R
n;
(N3) for all (t∗, x∗) ∈ [t0, ϑ0] × R
n, (J1, J2) ∈ T (t∗, x∗) there exists a motion
y(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗) such that
(J1, J2) ∈ T (t, y(t)), t ∈ [t∗, ϑ0].
Then T (t, x) ⊂ N (t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n.
This proposition follows from [3, Theorem 1.4].
Further we limit our attention to closed multivalues maps. The map T : [t0, ϑ0]×R
n →
P(R2) is called closed if its graph is closed T , i.e. Cl[T ] = T . Here Cl denotes the closure
of graph:
[ClT ](t, x) , {(J1, J2) : ∃{(t
k, xk)}∞k=1 ⊂ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n ∃{(zk1 , z
k
2 )} ⊂ R
2 :
(zk1 , z
k
2 ) ∈ T (t
k, xk), (tk, xk)→ (t, x), (zk1 , z
k
2 )→ (J1, J2), k →∞}.
Let I be a indexing set. Let multivalued maps T α : [t0, ϑ0]×R
n → P(R2), α ∈ I, satisfy
conditions (N1)–(N3). Define the map T ∗ : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → P(R2) by the rule T ∗ = ClT ,
where
T (t, x) ,
[⋃
α∈I
T α(t, x)
]
.
The multivalued map T ∗ is closed has compact images and satisfies conditions (N1)–(N3).
By T + denote the closure of pointwise union of all upper semicontinuous multivalued map
from [t0, ϑ0] × R
n to R2 satisfying conditions (N1)–(N3). It follows [3] that T +(t, x) =
N (t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n.
Further we formulate condition (N3) in the terms of viability theory and obtain the
infinitesimal form of this condition.
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Theorem 1. Let the map T : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → P(R2) be closed. Then condition (N3) is
equivalent to the following one: for all (t∗, x∗) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]×R
n, (J1, J2) ∈ T (t∗, x∗) there exist
θ > t∗ and y(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗) such that
(J1, J2) ∈ T (t, y(t)), t ∈ [t∗, θ].
Theorem 1 is proved in section 5.
In order to obtain the infinitesimal form of condition (N3) we define a derivative of a
multivalued map. By dist denote the following planar distance between the point (J1, J2) ∈
R
2 and the set A ⊂ R2:
dist[(J1, J2), A] , inf{|ζ1 − J1|+ |ζ2 − J2| : (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ A}.
Define the directional derivative of the multivalued map by the rule
DHT (t, x; (J1, J2), w) , lim inf
δ↓0,w′→w
dist[(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x+ δw
′)]
δ
.
Theorem 2. Let T : [t0, ϑ0]×R
n → P(R2) be closed. Then condition (N3) at the position
(t∗, x∗) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n is equivalent to the following one:
sup
(J1,J2)∈T (t∗,x∗)
inf
w∈F(t∗,x∗)
DHT (t∗, x∗; (J1, J2), w) = 0. (4)
Theorem 2 is proved in section 5.
Introduce the set
∂̂T (t∗, x∗; (J1;J2)) , {w : DHT (t∗, x∗; (J1, J2), w) = 0} .
Remark 2. Condition (4) can be formulated in the following way:
∂̂T (t∗, x∗; (J1;J2)) ∩ F(t∗, x∗) = 0, ∀(J1, J2) ∈ T (t∗, x∗).
The statement follows from the proof of theorem 2.
Let us show a sufficient condition for the function (c1, c2) : [t0, ϑ0]×R
n → R2 to provide
a Nash equilibrium. Denote
H1(t, x, s) , max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉, H2(t, x, s) , max
v∈Q
min
u∈P
〈s, f(t, x, u, v)〉.
Let (c1, c2) : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → R2, (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0] × R
n, w ∈ Rn define a modulus derivative
at the position (t, x) in the direction w ∈ Rn by the rule
dabs(c1, c2)(t, x;w) , lim inf
δ↓0,w′→w
|c1(t+ δ, x + δw
′)− c1(t, x)|+ |c2(t+ δ, x+ δw
′)− c2(t, x)|
δ
.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the function (c1, c2) : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → R2 is continuous,
(c1(ϑ0, ·), c2(ϑ0, ·)) = (σ1(·), σ2(·)), for each i the function ci is upper viscosity solution
of the equation
∂ci
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ci) = 0, (5)
and for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n
inf
w∈F(t,x)
dabs(c1, c2)(t, x;w) = 0.
Then for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]×R
n the pair of numbers (c1(t, x), c2(t, x)) is a Nash equilibrium
payoff of the game.
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Corollary 1 follows from the definition of modulus derivative and the property of upper
solution of equation (5) [7]: ωi(t, x) ≤ ci(t, x) for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n.
Let us show that the suggested method is a generalization of the method based on the
system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. This method provide a Nash solution in the class of
continuous strategies [5].
Proposition 2. Let the function (ϕ1, ϕ2) : [t0, ϑ0] × R
n → R2 be differentiable, and
(ϕ1(ϑ0, ·), ϕ2(ϑ0, ·)) = (σ1(·), σ2(·)). Suppose that the function (ϕ1, ϕ2) satisfies the fol-
lowing condition: for all positions (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]×R
n there exist un ∈ P , vn ∈ Q such that
max
u∈P
〈
∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u, v
n)
〉
=
〈
∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
, (6)
max
v∈Q
〈
∇ϕ2(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, v)
〉
=
〈
∇ϕ2(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
(7)
∂ϕi(t, x)
∂t
+
〈
∇ϕi(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
= 0, i = 1, 2. (8)
Then the function (ϕ1, ϕ2) satisfies the conditions of corollary 1.
This proposition is proved in section 5.
If one can choose the pair (un, vn) for each position (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]×R
n and the pair of
directions s1, s2 ∈ R
n uniquely, then the Hamiltonians Hi are well defined by the rule
Hi(t, x, s1, s2) ,
〈
si, f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
, i = 1, 2.
In this case condition (8) is equal to the following one: (ϕ1, ϕ2) is a solution of the system
∂ϕi
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ϕ1,∇ϕ2) = 0, i = 1, 2.
4 Example
Consider the nonzero-sum differential game with the dynamic{
x˙ = u,
y˙ = v,
(9)
t ∈ [0, 1], u, v ∈ [−1, 1]. Payoffs are determined by the formulas σ1(x, y) , −|x − y|,
σ2(x, y) , y. We recall that each player wants to maximize his payoff.
In order to determine the multivalued map N : [0, 1] × R2 → P(R2), we determine
auxiliary multivalued maps Si : [0, 1] ×R
2 → P(R), such that
Si(t, x∗, y∗) ,
{
z ∈ R : ωi(t, x∗, y∗) ≤ z ≤ c
+
i (t, x∗, y∗)
}
.
Here
c+i (t, x, y) , sup
u∈U ,v∈V
σi
(
x+
ϑ0∫
t
u(ξ)dξ, y +
ϑ0∫
t
v(ξ)dξ
)
.
Obviously,
N (t, x∗, y∗) ⊂ S1(t, x∗, y∗)× S2(t, x∗, y∗). (10)
First we determine the map S2. The value function of the game Γ2 is equal to
ω2(t, x∗, y∗) = y∗ + (1− t). Also, c
+
2 (t, x∗, y∗) = y∗ + (1− t). Consequently
S2(t, x∗, y∗) = y∗ + (1− t). (11)
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Let us determine the set S1. Programmed iteration method [6] yields that
ω1(t, x∗, y∗) = −|x∗ − y∗|.
Moreover
c+1 (t, x∗, y∗) = min
{
− |x∗ − y∗|+ 2(1 − t), 0
}
.
We obtain that
S1(t, x∗, y∗) =
[
ω1(t, x∗, y∗), c
+
1 (t, x∗, y∗)
]
. (12)
Now we compute the map N (t, x∗, y∗). The linearity of right hand of (9) and the
convexity of restrictions on control yield that any control can be substitute by the pair of
constant controls (u, v) ∈ P ×Q. We have that for all (J1, J2) ∈ S1(t, x∗, y∗)× S2(t, x∗, y∗)
DHN (t, x∗, y∗; (J1, J2), (u, v)) ≥ lim inf
δ↓0,v′→v
|y∗ + δv
′ + (1− t− δ)− y∗ − (1− t)|
δ
= |v − 1|.
Therefore, if DHN (t, x∗, y∗; (J1, J2), w) = 0 for the pair w = (u, v), then v = 1.
First we consider the case y∗ ≥ x∗. Let (J1, J2) ∈ N (t, x∗, y∗). There exists a mo-
tion (x(·), y(·)) ∈ Sol(t, x∗, y∗) such that (J1, J2) ∈ N (θ, x(θ), y(θ)), θ ∈ [t, 1]. Since
DHN (t, x∗, y∗; (J1, J2), w) = 0 only if v = 1, there exists u ∈ [−1, 1] such that x(1) =
x∗ + u(1 − t), y(1) = y∗ + (1 − t). Consequently y(1) ≥ x(1). From condition (N2) we get
that
J1 = σ1(x(1), y(1)) = −y(1) + x(1) = −y∗ − (1− t) + x∗ + u(1− t)
= −y∗ + x∗ + (1− t)(u− 1) ≤ −y∗ + x∗ = −|x∗ − y∗|.
The equality is achieved only if u = 1. Condition (N1) yields that the the following inclusion
is fulfilled
N (t, x∗, y∗) ⊂ {(−|x∗ − y∗|, y∗ + (1− t))}.
Substituting value (1, 1) for w in formula for DHN (t, x∗, y∗; (−|x∗− y∗|, y∗+ (1− t)), w) we
claim that for y∗ ≥ x∗
N (t, x∗, y∗) =
{
(−|x∗ − y∗|, y∗ + (1− t))
}
.
Now let y∗ < x∗. We shall show that
N (t, x∗, y∗) = S1(t, x∗, y∗)× S2(t, x∗, y∗) =[
− |x∗ − y∗|,min
{
− |x∗ − y∗|+ 2(1 − t), 0
}]
×
{
y∗ + (1− t)
}
.
Clearly, conditions (N1) and (N2) hold for this map. Let γ0 be a maximal number of segment
[0, 2] such that −|x∗ − y∗|+ γ0(1− t) ≤ 0. If (J1, J2) ∈ N (t, x∗, y∗), then J2 = y∗ + (1− t),
J1 = −|x∗ − y∗| + d(1 − t) for some d ∈ [0, γ0]. Let us prove that there exists a number
δ > 0 with the property
(J1, J2) ∈ N (t+ δ, x∗ + δu, y∗ + δ) (13)
for u = 1− d. It is sufficient to prove that
J1 ∈
[
y∗ − x∗ + δd,min
{
y∗ − x∗ + δd + 2(1− t− δ), 0
}]
.
Indeed, y∗ − x∗ + d(1− t) ≥ y∗ − x∗ + δd for δ < (1− t). Since d ≤ γ0, we obtain that
J1 = y∗ − x∗ + d(1− t) ≤ y∗ − x∗ + δd+ γ0(1− t− δ).
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Also
y∗ − x∗ + δd + γ0(1− t− δ) ≤ min
{
y∗ − x∗ + dδ + 2(1− t− δ); 0
}
.
Actually, since γ0 ≤ 2, the following inequality is fulfilled
y∗ − x∗ + δd+ γ0(1− t− δ) ≤ y∗ − x∗ + dδ + 2(1 − t− δ).
Moreover y∗ − x∗ + δd+ γ0(1− t− δ) ≤ δd− γ0δ ≤ 0. Thus the condition
J1 ≤ min
{
y∗ − x∗ + δd+ 2(1 − t− δ), 0
}
= y∗ − x∗ + δd+ γ1(1− t− δ)
is valid also. It follows from (13) that
DHN (t, x∗, y∗; (J1, J2), (1 − d, 1)) = 0.
Since N (t, x∗, y∗) coincide with the set S1(t, x∗, y∗)×S2(t, x∗, y∗) in this case, we claim that
the set N (t, x∗, y∗) is Nash value of the game at the position (t, x∗, y∗).
Let us compare the obtained result with the method based on system of Hamilton-Jacobi
equations [5]. In considered case the system of equations is given by
∂ϕ1
∂t
+
∂ϕ1
∂x
uˆ(t, x, y) +
∂ϕ1
∂y
vˆ(t, x, y) = 0
∂ϕ2
∂t
+
∂ϕ2
∂x
uˆ(t, x, y) +
∂ϕ2
∂y
vˆ(t, x, y) = 0.
(14)
Here the values uˆ(t, x, y) and vˆ(t, x, y) are determined by the following conditions
∂ϕ1(t, x, y)
∂x
uˆ(t, x, y) = max
u∈P
[∂ϕ1(t, x, y)
∂x
u
]
,
∂ϕ2(t, x, y)
∂y
vˆ(t, x, y) = max
v∈Q
[
∂ϕ2(t, x, y)
∂y
v
]
.
It follows from Proposition 2 that if a pair of functions (ϕ1, ϕ2) is a solution of the system
(14), then ϕ2(t, x, y) = y + (1 − t). Thus v∗(t, x, y) = 1. Consequently, the system (14)
reduces to the equation
∂ϕ1
∂t
+
∣∣∣∣∂ϕ1∂x
∣∣∣∣+ ∂ϕ1∂y = 0. (15)
By [7, Theorem 5.6] we obtain that the function
ϕ1(t, x, y) =

x− y, x ≤ y,
−x+ y + 2(1 − t), x > y,−x+ y + 2(1 − t) < 0,
0, x > y,−x+ y + 2(1 − t) ≥ 0
is a minimax solution of equation (15). Indeed if ϕ1 is smooth at (t, x, y) then equation (15)
is fulfilled in classical sense. On a planes {(t, x, y) : x = y}, {(t, x, y) : −x+y+2(1− t) = 0}
we have that the Clarke subdifferential is the convex hull of two limit of partial derivatives
of the function ϕ1. By well-known properties of subdifferentials and superdifferentail, the
continuity and positive homogeneity of equation (15) we obtain that ϕ1 satisfies conditions
U4 and L4 of [7].
The function ϕ1 is nonsmooth. Since the minimax solution is unique, and any classical
solution is minimax, we claim that system (14) have no classical solution. One may obtain
from the formulae for N (t, x, y) that (ϕ1(t, x, y), ϕ2(t, x, y)) ∈ N (t, x, y). Moreover,
ϕ1(t, x, y) = max
{
J1 ∈ R : ∃J2 ∈ R (J1, J2) ∈ N (t, x, y)
}
,
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{ϕ2(t, x, y)} =
{
J1 ∈ R : ∃J2 (J1, J2) ∈ N (t, x, y)
}
.
In other words, the value (ϕ1(t, x, y), ϕ2(t, x, y)) is the maximal Nash equilibrium payoff
of the game at the position (t, x, y).
One can check that the pair of functions (ϕ1, ϕ2) satisfies the conditions of corollary
1. Simultaneity, there exists a family of function satisfying the condition of corollary 1.
Actually, if γ ∈ [0, 2], then put
cγ1(t, x∗, y∗) =
{
−|x∗ − y∗|, y∗ ≥ x∗;
min
{
− |x∗ − y∗|+ γ(1− t); 0
}
, y∗ < x∗
cγ2(t, x∗, y∗) = y∗ + (1− t).
Let us show that the pair of functions (cγ1 , c
γ
2) satisfy the conditions of corollary 1. We have
that in our case
H1(t, x, y, sx, sy) = |sx| − |sy|, H2(t, x, y, sx, sy) = |sy| − |sx|.
First we prove that the functions cγi are the upper solution of equations (5). By [7, condition
U4] it suffices to show that for all (t, x, y) ∈ [t0, ϑ0] × R
2 (a, sx, sy) ∈ D
−cγi (t, x, y) the
following inequalities holds
a+Hi(sx, sy) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2. (16)
Here D− denotes the subdifferential [7, (6.10)]. The computing of subdifferentials gives that
D−cγ1(t, x, y) =

{(0,−1, 1)}, y > x,
{(0, 0, 0)}, y < x < y + γ(1− t),
{(−γ,−1, 1)}, x > y + γ(1− t),
{(0, λ,−λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, x = y,
{(−λγ,−λ, λ) : λ ∈ [0, 1]}, x = y + γ(1− t).
D−cγ2(t, x, y) = {(−1, 0, 1)}.
Substituting the values of subdifferentials, we get that (16) is valid for i = 1, 2.
Also ci(1, x∗, y∗) = σi(x∗, y∗). Moreover, dabs(c
γ
1 , c
γ
2)(t, x∗, y∗; 1− d, 1) = 0 for
d =
{
0, y∗ ≥ x∗;
max
{
r ∈ [0, γ] : −|x∗ − y∗|+ r(1− t) ≤ 0
}
, y∗ < x∗.
Note that (ϕ1, ϕ2) = (c
2
1, c
2
2).
5 Weak invariance of the set of values
In this section the statements formulated in section 3 are proved.
Proof of Theorem 1. If condition (N3) holds, then one can put θ = ϑ0.
Now suppose that for all (t∗, x∗), (J1, J2) ∈ T (t∗, x∗) there exist θ ∈ [t∗, ϑ0] and a motion
y(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗), such that the following condition is fulfilled
(J1, J2) ∈ T (t, y(t)), t ∈ [t∗, θ]. (17)
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Let Θ be a set of moments θ satisfying condition (17) for some y(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗). Denote
τ , supΘ. We have that τ ∈ Θ. Indeed, let a sequence {θk}
∞
k=1 ⊂ Θ tend to τ . One can
assume that θk < θk+1 ≤ τ . For every k condition (17) is valid under θ = θk, y(·) =
yk(·) ∈ Sol(t∗, x∗). The compactness of bundle of motions yields that yk(·)→ y
∗(·), k →∞,
here y∗(·) is an element of Sol(t∗, x∗). The closeness of the map T gives that (J1, J2) ∈
T (θk, y
∗(θk)). By the same argument we claim that (J1, J2) ∈ T (τ, y
∗(τ)). Denote x∗ =
y∗(τ).
Let us show that τ = ϑ0. If τ < ϑ0, then there exist a motion yˆ(·) ∈ Sol(τ, x
∗) and a
moment θ′ > τ such that (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, yˆ(t)), t ∈ [τ, θ
′]. Consider a motion
y˜(t) ,
{
y∗(t), t ∈ [t∗, τ ],
yˆ(t), t ∈ [τ, θ′].
By definition of θ′ it follows that (17) is valid under θ = θ′, y(·) = y˜(·). Thus θ′ ∈ Θ, this
contradicts with the choice of τ . Consequently, τ = ϑ0 and condition (N3) holds.
Proof of theorem 2. Let us introduce a graph of map T
grT , {(t, x, J1, J2) : (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0]× R
n, (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, x)}.
One can reformulate the condition of theorem 1 in the following way: the graph of T is
weakly invariant under the differential inclusion x˙J˙1
J˙2
 ∈ F̂(t, x) , co

 f(t, x, u, v)0
0
 : u ∈ P, v ∈ Q
 .
The condition of weak invariance of the multivalued map T under differential inclusion F̂
is equivalent [7, 8] to the following condition
Dt(grT )(t, x, J1, J2) ∩ F̂(t, x) 6= ∅ (18)
for all (t, x) ∈ [t0, ϑ0] × R
n, (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, x). Here Dt denotes right-hand derivative in t.
Let G ⊂ [t0, ϑ0]× R
m, G[t] denote a section of G by t:
G[t] , {w ∈ Rm : (t, x) ∈ G},
symbol d denote Euclidian distance between a point and a set. Following [7], [8] put
(DtG)(t, y) ,
{
h ∈ Rm : lim inf
δ→0
d(y + δh;G[t + δ])
δ
= 0
}
.
Let us show that conditions (4) and (18) are equivalent.
Condition (4) means that for every pair (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, x) the following condition holds:
inf
w∈F(t,x)
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x + δ(w + γ))
]
δ
= 0.
The lower boundary by w in the formula
inf
w∈F(t,x)
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x + δ(w + γ))
]
δ
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is attained for all (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, x). Indeed, let {w
r}∞r=1 be a minimizing sequence. By the
compactness of F(t, x) one can assume that wr → w∗, r → ∞, w∗ ∈ F(t, x). Let us show
that
b˜ , inf
w∈F(t,x)
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x+ δ(w + γ))
]
δ
= lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x + δ(w
∗ + γ))
]
δ
. (19)
Indeed for every r ∈ N there exist a sequences {δr,k}∞k=1, {γ
r,k}∞k=1 such that δ
r,k, ‖γr,k‖ → 0,
k →∞ and
br , lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, t+ δ(w
r + γ))
]
δ
= lim
k→∞
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ
r,k, t+ δr,k(wr + γr,k))
]
δr,k
.
Let kˆ(r) be a number such that
δr,kˆ(r), ‖γr,kˆ(r)‖,
∣∣∣∣∣dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ
r,kˆ(r), t+ δr,kˆ(r)(wr + γr,kˆ(r)))
]
δr,kˆ(r)
− br
∣∣∣∣∣ < 2−r.
Put δˆr , δr,kˆ(r), γˆr , γr,kˆ(r) + wr − w∗. Note that δˆr, ‖γˆr‖ → 0, r →∞.
We have that
inf
w∈F(t,x)
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x+ δ(w + γ))
]
δ
≤ lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x + δ(w
∗ + γ))
]
δ
≤ lim
r→∞
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δˆ
r, x+ δˆr(w∗ + γˆr))
]
δˆr
. (20)
Further,
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δˆ
r, x+ δˆr(w∗ + γˆr))
]
δˆr
=
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ
r,kˆ(r), x+ δr,kˆ(r)(w∗ + γr,kˆ(r) + wr − w∗))
]
δr,kˆ(r)
=
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ
r,kˆ(r), x+ δr,kˆ(r)(wk + γr,kˆ(r)))
]
δr,kˆ(r)
≤ br + 2−r → b˜, r →∞.
We have that in (20) right and left hands are equal. This means that condition (19) is valid.
Thus, condition (4) is equivalent to the following one: for all (J1, J2) ∈ T (t, x) there
exists w ∈ F(t, x) such that
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
dist
[
(J1, J2),T (t+ δ, x+ δ(w + γ))
]
δ
=
lim inf
δ↓0,γ∈Rn,‖γ‖↓0
inf
{
|ζ1 − J1|+ |ζ2 − J2|
δ
: (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ T (t+ δ, x+ δ(w + γ))
}
= 0. (21)
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Now let us prove that this condition is equivalent to condition (18).
First we assume that condition (18) is valid. This means that there exist sequences
{δk}∞k=1 ⊂ R, {γ
k}∞k=1 ⊂ R
n, {εk1}
∞
k=1, {ε
k
2}
∞
k=1 ⊂ R such that
• δk, ‖γk‖, εk1 , ε
k
2 → 0, k →∞;
•
(
t+ δk, x+ δk(w + γk), J1 + δ
kεk1 , J2 + δ
kεk2
)
∈ grT .
One can reformulate the second condition as
(J1 + δ
kεk1 , J2 + δ
kεk2) ∈ T (t+ δ
k, t+ δk(w + γk)).
Thus,
inf
{
|ζ1 − J1|+ |ζ2 − J2|
δk
: (ζ1, ζ2) ∈ T (t+ δ
k, x+ δ(w + γk))
}
= εk1 + ε
k
2 .
By the choice {εk1}, {ε
k
2} we obtain that condition (21) holds.
Now let condition (21) be fulfilled, prove that (18) is valid. Indeed, let {δk}∞k=1, {γ}
∞
k=1
be a minimizing sequence. By compactness of the sets T
(
t+ δk, x+ δk(w+ γk)
)
for each k
there exist εk1 and ε
k
2 such that(
J1 + δ
kεk1 , J2 + δ
kεk2
)
∈ T (t, x+ δk(w + γk)).
It follows from (21) that εk1 , ε
k
2 → 0, k → ∞. Let us estimate
d
(
(w + δkw, J1, J2), grT [t+ δ
k]
)
. We have that(
t+ δk, x+ δk(w + γk), J1 + δ
kεk1 , J2 + δ
kεk2
)
∈ grT .
Consequently,
d
(
(w + δkw, J1, J2), grT [t+ δ
k]
)
≤ δk
√
‖γk‖2 + (εk1)
2 + (εk2)
2.
The convergence δk, ‖γk‖, εk1 , ε
k
2 → 0 as k →∞ yields the equality w0
0
 ∈ Dt(grT )(t, x, J1, J2).
Since F̂(t, x) = F × {(0, 0)}, we claim that (18) is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from (6) and the Isaacs condition that〈
∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
≥ max
u∈P
min
v∈Q
〈
∇ϕ1(t, x), f(t, x, u, v)
〉
= H1(t, x,∇ϕ1(t, x)).
Analogously, it follows from (7) and the Isaacs condition that〈
∇ϕ2(t, x), f(t, x, u
n, vn)
〉
≥ max
v∈Q
min
u∈P
〈
∇ϕ2(t, x), f(t, x, u, v)
〉
= H2(t, x,∇ϕ2(t, x)).
Therefore, using (8) we claim that
∂ϕi(t, x)
∂t
+Hi(t, x,∇ϕi(t, x)) ≤ 0, i = 1, 2.
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Since the function ϕi is differentiable, its subdifferential at the position (t, x) is equal to
{∂ϕ1(t, x)/∂t,∇ϕ1(t, x)}. Consequently, the function ϕ1 is the upper solution of equation
(5) for i = 1 [7, Condition (U4)]. Analogously, the function ϕ2 is the upper solution of
equation (5) for i = 2.
Now let us show that dabs(ϕ1, ϕ2)(t, x;w) = 0 for w ∈ F(t, x). Put w = f(t, x, u
n, vn).
Indeed,
dabs(ϕ1, ϕ2)(t, x;w)
= lim inf
δ↓0,‖γ‖→0
|ϕ1(t+ δ, x+ δ(w + γ))− ϕ1(t, x)| + |ϕ2(t+ δ, x + δ(w + γ))− ϕ2(t, x)|
δ
.
Let {δk}∞k=1 ⊂ R, {γ
k}∞k=1 ⊂ R
n be a minimizing sequence. Then
dabs(ϕ1, ϕ2)(t, x;w)
= lim
k→∞
|ϕ1(t+ δ
k, x+ δk(w + γk))− ϕ1(t, x)|+ |ϕ2(t+ δ
k, x+ δ(w + γk))− ϕ2(t, x)|
δk
= lim
k→∞
1
δk
[∣∣∣∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
δk + 〈∇ϕ1(t, x), δ
k(w + γk)〉+ o(δk)
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∂ϕ2(t, x)
∂t
δk + 〈∇ϕ2(t, x), δ
k(w + γk)〉+ o(δk)
∣∣∣]
=
∣∣∣∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+ 〈∇ϕ1(t, x), w〉
∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣∂ϕ2(t, x)
∂t
+ 〈∇ϕ2(t, x), w〉
∣∣∣.
By choice of w = f(t, x, un, vn) and condition (8) we have that
∂ϕ1(t, x)
∂t
+ 〈∇ϕ1(t, x), w〉 =
∂ϕ2(t, x)
∂t
+ 〈∇ϕ2(t, x), w〉 = 0.
Thus dabs(ϕ1, ϕ2)(t, x;w) = 0.
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